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ELIMINATION OF THE CONDUCT REQUIREMENT IN
GOVERNMENT MONOPOLIZATION CASES
ALFRED F. DOUGHERTY, JR.*
JOHN B. KiRKwoOD**
JAMES D. HuRwrrz***
INTRODUCTION
On July 12, 1978, Professor John Flynn of the University of Utah Law
School urged the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws
and Procedures (National Commission or NCRALP) to consider recom-
mending that Congress amend section 2 of the Sherman Act to permit the
government to challenge persistent and substantial monopoly power with-
out showing that the monopoly power was acquired or maintained through
objectionable conduct.' In Professor Flynn's view, eliminating the prevail-
ing conduct requirement in certain government monopolization cases
would expedite litigation and produce more effective remedies, two of the
National Commission's central objectives.2 In hearings on the proposal, a
* Mr. Dougherty (J.D., George Washington University Law School, 1970) is the Director
of the Bureau of Competition at the Federal Trade Commission and previously was a partner
in the Washington, D.C. law firm of Hogan & Hartson. This article is adapted from testimony
Mr. Dougherty presented to the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and
Procedures on October 17, 1978. The article does not express the views of the Federal Trade
Commission or of any individual Commissioner.
** Mr. Kirkwood (J.D., Harvard Law School, 1973; M.P.P., John F. Kennedy School of
Government, Harvard University, 1974) is the Assistant Director for Planning in the Bureau
of Competition.
*** Mr. Hurwitz (J.D., University of California, Berkeley, 1972; L.L.M., London School
of Economics and Political Science, University of London, 1973) is a senior staff attorney in
the Planning Office of the Bureau of Competition.
The authors are particularly grateful to Harvey Goldschmid, Louis Schwartz, John
Flynn, Oliver Williamson, Joseph Brodley, and Douglas Dobson for their many useful com-
ments and suggestions. We also are grateful to William E. Kovacic for his comments and
editorial assistance.
Statement of John J. Flynn, National Comm. for the Review of Antitrust Laws and
Proc. (July 12, 1978). Although Professor Flynn is a consultant to the FTC, he was presenting
his personal views in this testimony.
Section 2 of the Sherman Act states:
Every person who shall monopolize or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty
of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding
one million dollars if a corporation, or if any other person, one hundred thousand
dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or both said punishments,
in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
2 The National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures (NCRALP
or National Commission) was established by Presidential Executive Order, December 1, 1977.
Section 2 of that Order charged NCRALP with studying and making recommendations on
two subjects: (1) complex antitrust cases; and (2) antitrust exemptions and immunities. With
84 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
number of other distinguished economists and legal scholars advocated
similar changes.3 In addition, the Bureau of Competition of the Federal
Trade Commission also recommended an amendment to section 2 to
achieve this same result.' Finally, the Federal Trade Commission itself
respect to the former, the National Commission was to consider:
(a) "revision of procedural and substantive rules of law needed to expedite the
resolution of complex antitrust cases,"
(b) "development of proposals for making the remedies available in such cases
more effective .. "
Exec. Order No. 12022, § 2(a)(1), 3 C.F.R. 155, 156 (1977)(emphasis added).
Professor Phillip Areeda of the Harvard Law School and Walter Adams, Professor of
Economics at Michigan State University, testified before NCRALP on September 13, 1978.
Additionally, Oliver Williamson, Professor of Economics and Social Science at the University
of Pennsylvania; Professor Louis Schwartz of the University of Pennsylvania Law School; and
Professor Harvey Goldschmid of the Columbia Law School, appeared with Mr. Dougherty in
support of the Bureau of Competition's no-conduct monopolization proposal. Professor Rob-
ert Bork of the Yale Law School, Professor Thomas Kauper of the University of Michigan
Law School, and Judge Frederick Lacey (U.S.D.C., N.J.) testified in opposition to various
aspects of the proposal.
The Bureau of Competition submitted the following outline of a proposal for amending
§ 2 of the Sherman Act.
OUTLINE FOR PROPOSED SHERMAN ACT
SECTION 2A
I. PURPOSE
Sherman Act Section 2A would permit the government to institute an
expedited proceeding seeking structural (or other) relief where persist-
ent, substantial monopoly power is not justified by patents or efficien-
cies of scale.
I. NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
A. Proceedings could be instituted only by designated Federal agen-
cies.
B. The proceedings would be equitable in nature.
C. Neither criminal sanctions nor civil penalties would be appropri-
ate as remedies.
I. LIABILITY
To establish that a firm has substantial, persistent monopoly power,
the government would have to demonstrate that:
A. The firm has had monopoly power in a properly defined relevant
market for the five years preceding the filing of the complaint; and
B. Sales in the relevant market exceeded $500,000,000 in the year
immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.
IV. REMEDY
A. After a finding of substantial, persistent monopoly power, the
ordinary remedy would be structural relief sufficient to create as much
competition as is feasible without substantial loss of efficiencies of
scale.
1. Structural relief would include such remedies as:
(a) Dissolution, including divestiture and spin-off;
(b) Patent licensing; and
(c) Trademark licensing or cancellation.
Dissolution would be the preferred remedy (if feasible and construc-
tive).
2. Efficiencies of-scale would be limited to those efficiencies which
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formally endorsed the no-conduct monopolization concept and urged that
Congress enact legislation based upon it. 5
In its final report, the majority of the National Commission concluded
that a no-conduct monopolization approach would "represent a logical
solution" to several problems that hinder current monopolization prac-
tice.6 The National Commission recognized that: "[Tlhe chief aim of
government litigation under Section 2 of the Sherman Act is the dissipa-
tion ofpersistent monopoly power. Proof of bad conduct is simply not
central to such a proceeding."7 In NCRALP's view, an evaluation of past
conduct is relevant only to the extent it would illuminate the key issues:
would be reduced or lost through operation of the structural relief
under consideration.
B. Under certain circumstances, monopoly power attributable to
patents would be temporarily protected.
1. Original patents - During the life of a patent which led to the
original establishment of monopoly power, the running of the five-year
period of persistence would be tolled.
2. Improvement patents - The acquisition of a patent which prolongs
the monopoly power conferred by an original patent would not toll the
running of the five-year period of persistence, except in the case of a.
displacement patent.
3. Displacement patents - A displacement patent is a patent so radi-
cally different from the original patent that it, in effect, confers a new
monopoly. A displacement patent would be treated as an original
patent.
Statement of Alfred F. Dougherty, Jr., National Comm. for the Review of Antitrust Laws and
Proc. (October 17, 1978).
The Bureau of Competition continues to favor legislative adoption of the general ap-
proach reflected in this proposal. Specific details of this approach, however, may be modified
as new evidence and analysis become available. Indeed, on the basis of recent analysis, the
Bureau would now provide some protection for significant, recent, unpatented innovation and
require a longer period of persistence than the five years suggested in this proposal.
5 Statement of the Federal Trade Commission, with a Separate Statement of Commis-
sioner Dixon, to the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures,
November 17, 1978.
6 NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAws AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO
7Mu PRE DENT AND Tim ATroRNLv GENERAL, 158 (Jan. 22, 1979) [hereinafter cited as NCRALP
REPORT], reprinted in 897 ANTrrRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)(Special Supp.) at 47.
Three basic positions emerged among NCRALP's members. One group favored legisla-
tive revision of the Sherman Act to permit the government to challenge persistent monopoly
power without proving the defendant engaged in anticompetitive conduct. Id. at 157, 897
ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 45. A second group, reflecting the
majority position, favored the adoption of a judicial presumption that persistent monopoly
power is caused by culpable conduct. Id.; see United States v. Grinnell Corp., 236 F. Supp.
244 (D.R.I. 1964), aff'd except as to decree, 384 U.S. 563 (1966). Although the government
need not demonstrate anticompetitive conduct as a part of its case-in-chief, when courts
apply this presumption, a defendant could introduce conduct evidence to rebut it. Id. Finally,
a third group of Commissioners favored retention of the current conduct requirement as an
element of the government's prima facie case. Id. at 161-62, 897 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP.
(BNA)(Special Supp.) at 49.
7 Id. at 158, 897 ANTITRusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)(Spec.ial Supp.) at 48. See also id.
at 162, 897 ANTrrmusT & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)(Special Supp.) at 49.
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the existence of persistent monopoly power, and the availability of
competition-enhancing remedies to dissipate it. Elimination of the con-
duct requirement would free litigants and courts from lengthy and expen-
sive retrospective evaluations of behavior. Moreover, the NCRALP major-
ity felt that an efficiencies defense - a feature of many no-conduct propos-
als - would focus additional, needed attention on the process of fashioning
a remedy that preserves rather than ignores efficiences.5
Thus, the National Commission endorsed many of the most important
principles underlying the no-conduct monopolization approach. Although
the National Commission could not recommend congressional enactment
of this approach without further study of certain key issues, NCRALP
urged Congress to "undertake an inquiry aimed at strengthening the abil-
ity of the Sherman Act to deal with persistent monopoly power,"' and to
take as a starting point for this inquiry the fundamental principles that
the National Commission had endorsed.
The Commission's conclusions are consistent with the analysis in a
growing body of academic commentary supporting the no-conduct mono-
polization approach. For example, in recent years, several distinguished
lawyers and economists have recognized that appraising past conduct is
seldom necessary to identify and remedy monopoly power. These commen-
See note 7 supra.
NCRALP REPORT, supra note 6, at 141, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)(Spe-
cial Supp.) at 40. The full text of NCRALP's second recommendation states:
The appropriate Congressional committees should undertake an inquiry aimed at
strengthening the ability of the Sherman Act to deal with persistent monopoly
power. Such an inquiry should be based on the following principles:
(a) the chief goal of the Sherman Act monopolization provision is the dissipa-
tion of persistent monopoly power;
(b) persistent monopoly power can be presumed to be maintained through
deliberate conduct that would violate traditional Sherman Section 2 standards;
(c) the current litigation process under Sherman Section 2 does not effec-
tively remedy persistent monopoly power, in part because the need to prove culpa-
ble conduct leads to much evidence not relevant to the proof of monopoly power or
the nature of effective relief and creates strong incentives for the government to
focus its resources on the liability stage of a monopolization proceeding rather than
relief;
(d) the adoption of a standard enabling the government to obtain structural
relief on a showing of persistent monopoly power without the need to prove culpable
conduct would rationalize monopolization litigation in accordance with the preced-
ing principles, but would also raise the following issues, which should be examined
by Congress before any specific statutory change is enacted:
(1) the definition of monopoly power to be applied in using the standard;
(2) the type and scope of defenses to be permitted and the stage of the
litigation at which they should be permitted;
(3) whether efficiency considerations should be permitted to affect the
availability of structural relief where anticompetitive conduct has created or main-
tained the monopoly; and
(4) the advisability of adopting a conduct-free liability standard in view
of possible disincentives to business growth or public perceptions of unfairness.
Id. at 141-42, 897 ANTrrRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) (Special Supp.) at 40.
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tators have recommended, therefore, that such an evaluation should be
eliminated as a legal requirement in monopolization cases. For instance,
Profess6r Oliver Williamson had argued that governmental intervention
may be appropriate, whether or not reprehensible conduct is shown, when-
ever substantial, unjustifiable market power is unlikely to be eroded by
market forces within a reasonable period of time." Senator Philip Hart
recommended similar changes as part of the Monopolization Reform Act
of 1976," Additionally, Professors Areeda and Turner advocate a similar
approach in their new treatise.'
2
A generally accepted proposition, basic to all these proposals, is that
substantial, persistent monopoly power, unjustified by patents or efficien-
cies, is undesirable. The propensity of monopoly power to restrict output,
raise prices, and redistribute income from producers to consumers is undis-
puted. 3 The tendency of such power to retard innovation, tolerate slack
and inefficiency, and adversely affect other economic and social goals of
competition policy is less a matter of consensus, but remains a matter of
real concern."
The controversy over a no-conduct standard, therefore, does not con-
cern the undesirability of substantial, persistent monopoly power. Rather,
the disagreement concerns the appropriate requirements of identifying and
dissipating such power. Opponents of the no-conduct approach contend
that it is vital to prove that monopoly power was acquired or maintained
through some form of undesirable conduct rather than through normal or
even superior business behavior. 5 We believe, however, that proof of objec-
tionable conduct is neither vital nor desirable in every government mono-
polization case. On the contrary, in the limited circumstances in which a
no-conduct action would be appropriate, using such an approach should
both advance the broad economic (and social) goals of competition policy
and promote the two more specific objectives of particular concern to the
11 See Williamson, Dominant Firms and the Monopoly Problem: Market Failure
Considerations, 85 HARv. L. Rnv. 1512 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Williamson].
1, S. 3429, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., 122 CONG. Rac. 13872 (1976). No hearings were held on
this bill. Although separate and distinct proposals, the Bureau of Competition's proposal and
another of Senator Hart's proposals, the Industrial Reorganization Act, S. 1167, 93rd Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973), share the virtue of making the appraisal of past conduct largely unnecessary
in a proceeding directed at significant market power.
1, 3 P. ARaRDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAw 614-23 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
AREEDA & TURNER.]
13 See R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 179
(1977) [hereinafter cited as BORK]; R. POSNER, ANTrRUST LAW: AN ECONOIc ANALYSIS 79
(1976) [hereinafter cited as PosNEl]; Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly in
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRTION: THE NEW LEARuNa 164, 166 (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann & J.
Weston eds. 1974) [hereinafter cited as INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRTION].
1" See generally W. SHEPHERD, THE TnmnrmNr OF MAzKr PowER (1975); INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION, supra note 13.
1" See McKinney, The Case Against No-Conduct Monopolization, 37 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 73 (1980). For a detailed exposition of the current conduct requirement, see L. SULLIVAN,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 94-132 (1977) [hereinafter cited as SULLiVAN].
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National Commission.
First, a no-conduct standard would lead to faster, more efficient pro-
ceedings. Conduct issues appear to consume a significant proportion of the
resources devoted to government monopolization cases."8 Yet, litigation of
these issues rarely is necessary to a determination of the real issues: the
existence of substantial, persistent monopoly power and the availability of
effective, beneficial remedies. 7
Second, eliminating the conduct requirement should produce more
effective remedies. The central purpose of no-conduct monopolization pro-
posals is to shift the focus of concern of government monopolization pro-
ceedings from a retrospective appraisal of a defendant's conduct to a pro-
spective inquiry concerning the availability of effective, beneficial reme-
dies for monopoly power."5 Such proposals seek to achieve this shift not
only by eliminating the conduct requirement, but also by expressing a
strong preference for structural remedies (where feasible and constructive),
and by making several procedural changes designed to expedite and im-
prove the litigation of remedial issues.'" In the remainder of this article,
we will present in greater detail the reasons underlying these two particular
conclusions, and in the process, address the key issues highlighted by the
National Commission.
I.
MORE EFFICIENT AND EXPEDITIOUS PROCEEDINGS
A. Litigation of conduct issues is costly and time consuming
As part of an empirical study chartered by NCRALP, Professor Peter
Gerhart attempted to determine the proportion of the litigation time de-
voted to various substantive issues."0 His data is based on interviews with
persons responsible for the litigation of three ongoing monopolization
cases: United States v. Iriternational Business Machines Corp. (IBM),21
Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,2 and SCM Corp. v. Xerox
Corp. 1 Professor Gerhart estimated that less than 10% of trial time in IBM
concerned market power, approximately 45-50% of the trial time involved
market definition, and 40% pertained to conduct. 2 In SCM, damage issues
,1 See text accompanying notes 20-29 infra.
,1 See text accompanying notes 30-80 infra.
,1 See note 4 supra.
," See note 4 supra.
20 NCRALP REPORT, supra note 6, vol. 2 at 95-96.
21 69 Civ. 200 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)(three year trial of government's affirmative case).
22 73 Civ. 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1973)(six month trial). See Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), aff'g in part and rev'g in part, 457 F. Supp. 404
(S.D.N.Y. 1978).
23 See SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983 (D. Conn. 1978).
24 NCRALP REPoir, supra note 6, vol. 2 at 95. Conduct here includes intent. Professor
Gerhart told us that he found that a surprisingly large proportion of time, particularly in
discovery, was devoted to issues of improper intent, even though such issues may not have
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appeared to comprise 40-50 % of the litigation time, 3-5% concerned mar-
ket power, market definition consumed 20-25%, and conduct inquiries ex-
hausted 30-40% of the time.2 Finally, Professor Gerhart estimated that
damage issues involved 15-20% of litigation time in Berkey, determining
market power took 3-5%, market definition consumed 15-25%, and conduct
issues comprised the remaining 45-60% of trial time."6 These estimates
indicate that significant amounts of time and resources, amounting to well
over one-third of the total litigation efforts, were devoted to the trial of
conduct issues in each case. Professor Gerhart's result are not only inter-
nally consistent but also are in complete harmony with Professor John
Flynn's estimates that between one-third and one-half of the length and
expense of several other major monopolization cases reasonably could be
attributed to litigation of conduct issues.Y Further-study may show that
additional government monopolization cases also fit this pattern.2
The timesaving impact of any no-conduct proposal is unlikely to be
great in terms of sheer numbers of cases. The estimates of Professors Ger-
hart and Flynn indicate, however, that such proposals may nevertheless
save considerable resources. Major government monopolization cases con-
sume the efforts of scores of private and government attorneys and their
staffs for years at a time. The public and private financial resources neces-
sary to support these cases runs into the millions, and perhaps hundreds
of millions of dollars. It would be an extraordinary achievement if one-
third of the effort and expense of every major government monopolization
case could be saved without serious substantive sacrifice, and perhaps with
been strictly relevant in any of the cases.
Professor Joseph Brodley of the Indiana University Law School pointed out to us that
Professor Gerhart's finding is consistent with the observations of those who studied earlier
monopolization cases. For example, Professor Kaysen emphasized the large role intent evi-
dence played in the trial of United States v. United Shoe Mach., Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.
Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954). In his monograph on the case, Professor
Kaysen declared:
[I]t is no exaggeration to say that an overall view of the' market and United's
position in it hardly emerged from the Government's presentation of its case at all,
so heavily was it pointed toward "intent." United, likewise used most of its presen-
tation for material of the same kind. . . . Material of these types filled up perhaps
two-thirds of the record of oral testimony.
C. KAYsEN, UNTrED STATES v. UNrrED SHOE MACHINEY CORI'ORATION 335-36 (1956).
u NCRALP REPORT, supra note 6, vol. 2 at 96.
26 Id.
" Professor Flynn formed this impression after reading the records in: Standard Oil v.
United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416
(2d Cir. 1945); and United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass.
1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954); and while serving as an advisor to the counsel
for the plaintiff in Telex Corp. v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 367 F. Supp. 258 (N.D.
Okla. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S.
802 (1975).
u For a list of cases which may warrant further investigation, see Letter from Professor
Flynn to Wendell B. Alcorn, Jr., Special Counsel to NCRALP (Oct. 2, 1978).
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tangible benefits.29
Opponents of the proposed no-conduct standard commonly argue, how-
ever, that litigation of conduct issues is substantively necessary to the
monopolization offense. In this regard, there are three distinct, substantive
concerns. The first consideration involves the internal efficiency of the
defendant firm as an ,affirmative defense to a monopolization charge. A
second issue concerns the potential disincentive effects on firms attempt-
ing to avoid litigation under the proposal. Finally, the third dispute in-
volves the fairness of applying a no-conduct standard to the defendant's
stockholders, creditors. and employees. We believe that none of these con-
cerns justifies rejection of the no-conduct approach.
1. Protection of internal efficiencies
In his testimony before NCRALP, Professor Robert Bork argued that
litigation of conduct issues is essential to enable a court to identify monop-
oly power based on efficiency.30 According to Professor Bork, there are only
three causes of persistent monopoly power: mergers, predation, and supe-
rior efficiency.3 ' Because mergers are covered by other laws, the principal
purpose of a monopolization case, the argument proceeds, is to character-
ize the defendant's conduct either as predatory or as an expression of
superior efficiency. In Professor Bork's view, eliminating the conduct stan-
dard would prevent a court from appraising a defendant's efficiency and
thus would create a serious risk of breaking up a monopolist who was
simply more efficient than his rivals.2
The Bureau of Cdmpetition's no-conduct proposal, however, presents
little risk of a serious efficiency loss to defendants., To the contrary, as a
prerequisite to imposition of relief under the Bureau's proposal, courts
must determine that the proposed relief will not result in a substantial loss
of efficiencies. Any category of efficiency would be recognized, including
engineering, marketing, managerial, or other efficiencies. This inquiry
2 It is possible that these numerical estimates may overstate the timesaving potential
of the Bureau of Competition's proposal, since scale efficiencies issues were not litigated fully
or at all in some of the cases analyzed and since some conduct evidence may have been
appropriate in some of the cases. In addition, the private cases cited may have involved more
conduct evidence than similar government civil cases would have involved. Private cases,
unlike government civil cases, tend to be tried to juries who may have greater relative interest
in conduct evidence. Moreover, a private plaintiff must prove that illegal conduct was respon-
sible for his asserted damages. On the other hand, Professor Gerhart has provided separate
estimates for the damage portions of the private cases which he studied. Even if the Bureau
of Competition's proposal requires litigation of additional issues and consideration of some
conduct evidence in some cases, litigation of the entire case should be expedited and substan-
tively improved by the procedural devices and changed incentives built into it.
S0 Statement of Robert H. Bork, National Comm. for the Review of Antitrust Laws and
Proc. (Sept. 13, 1978) [hereinafter cited as Bork Statement].
31 Id.
32 Id.
3 See note 4 supra.
11 Typically, efficiencies of scale will be of most concern in evaluating a proposed remedy
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replaces, and is more appropriate than, the backward evaluation of firm
conduct that Professor Bork would prefer." - _
Consider a firm with substantial, persistent monopoly power in a rele-
vant market. Professor Bork would allow the firm to prove that it obtained
and preserved power, not by engaging in predatory conduct, but by offer-
ing, for example, a better product, at a lower price, and with superior
service than its rivals. If structural relief would not'result in higher prices,
however, why would it be important to know whether or not the firm
historically had charged lower prices than its rivals? On the other hand, if
structural relief would substantially impair the firm's future performance
(e.g., lead to higher prices or inferior service), then structural relief should
not be ordered. Accordingly, this proposal can preserve the defendant's
internal efficiency by assessing the likely impact ofrelief, yet at the same
time it can secure the benefits of eliminating unnecessary litigation of
conduct issues.36
A second reason that the Bureau of Competition' no-conduct proposal
would not impose serious efficiency losses on defendants rests on a more
theoretical plane. Whereas Professor Bork asserts that'sustained monopoly
power must be due to superior efficiency (absent predatory conduct or
mergers)," we believe that a variety of other factors remain that also may
create or preserve monopoly power. Thus, the lack of predatory conduct
in a non-merger monopolization case does not necessarily imply that the
monopoly power in question is based on efficiencies worth protecting. For
example, as Professor Williamson convincingly argues, dominance may
arise through pure chance events or through the ineotitude of the monopo-
of dissolution, the preferred remedy under the no-conduct approach. Thus, in this article, we
often speak in terms of efficiencies of scale. In some circumstances, however, non-scale effi-
ciencies (e.g., quality control with trademark licensing remedies) may also be at issue. Of
course, where non-scale efficiencies are involved, they must be considered and protected like
scale efficiencies.
31 Certain limiting principles would apply to this efficiencies defense. First, a showing
of substantial scale efficiencies at one level of production or distribution in a vertically
integrated enterprise would not be a bar to structural relief applied at another level (absent
substantial efficiencies traceable to the vertical integration of the enterprise). Second, struc-
tural relief could not be defeated on the ground that an existing firm's size was necessary to
bargain effectively with large customers or suppliers, a purely redistributional concern.
11 A collateral argument for allowing the litigation of conduct issues is the claim that,
without an appraisal of conduct, the litigation process cannot reliably assess the likelihood
that a proposed remedy will induce substantial efficiency losses. In essence, this argument
concedes that although examining the effect of the proposed remedies on firm performance
is theoretically the correct approach, it cannot be carried out in practice with sufficient
certainty to be used alone. See Statement of Thomas Kauper, National Comm. for the Review
of Antitrust Laws and Proc. (Sept. 13, 1978). We would reject this argument, as applied to
most cases, for two reasons. First, as shown above, allowing a retrospective appraisal of firm
conduct is very expensive in terms of litigation time and resources. Second, as noted below,
reasonably accurate methodologies for measuring efficiencies of scale do not seem to exist,
and the incentives for expedition built into the proposal should make the trial of these issues
tractable. See note 59 infra.
31 Bork Statement, supra note 30.
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list's rivals. 8 Firms also may grow large and powerful because rivals, al-
though not inept, chose not to compete vigorously or pursue expansionist
policies, giving primacy to goals other than relentless profit maximization.
Even when a firm acquires monopoly power as a result of a better
product or a superior method of production, that power may persist for an
unacceptably long period of time after those original competitive advan-
tages have ceased to exist. Still, the monopolist may remain unchallenged.
For example, while potential rivals may be as efficient as the monopolist,
actual rivals may be inept, insufficiently motivated, or unable to challenge
the monopolist because of higher costs. Furthermore, even equally efficient
actual or potential rivals may be unable to mount an effective challenge
to the monopolist because of barriers to entry or expansion. Product differ-
entiation and capital requirements in some circumstances may constitute
such barriers to the entry or expansion of equally efficient rivals. 9
Substantial technological, marketing, personnel, and other require-
ments also can make challenges to monopolistic markets a lengthy and
risky proposition, even in the absence of true entry barriers. As Professor
Bork recognizes, entry will not immediately erode a monopolist's market
position in such circumstances. It takes considerable time to build produc-
tion facilities, refine management, production, and marketing techniques,
develop experienced personnel, and achieve brand recognition and accept-
ance.4" Entry is also an especially risky endeavor because of the possibility
that unfavorable chance events (e.g., unpredictable changes in product
technology, product demand, or supply costs) will intervene before the firm
has acquired sufficient size and experience to survive. Accordingly, even
equally efficient firms may hesitate to enter a market characterized by
3 Williamson, supra note 10, at 1517-23. Professor Williamson has pointed out to us that
the chance event argument can be elaborated. He notes that there is a difference between a
well-working and a perfectly-working enterprise system, just as there is a difference between
well-working and perfectly-working systems of other kinds. Perfectly-working assembly lines,
for example, might be described as those yielding no defective outcomes: all output is fault-
less. Presumably a perfectly-working enterprise system produces only efficient outcomes.
Despite best efforts, however, perfectly-working assembly lines do not exist. Some defec-
tive inputs may have been received; some workers may have erred; some unusual events may
have occurred. If a few final products are found to be defective for which an ex post remedy
is feasible, it is surely appropriate to take the corrective measures. This does not imply,
however, that the system is defective. Rather, complex systems predictably produce occa-
sional outliers and, when the outlier appears, corrective action is taken. This argument also
applies to an enterprise system, in which uncertainty is a basic operational feature. Although
chance events commonly even out, occasionally an unusual sequence of such events will
appear and produce an outlier outcome. Thus, although competition can normally be ex-
pected to perform self-policing functions effectively, rivalry of a small numbers kind can
result in occasional breakdowns, and the establishment of persistent monopoly power.
31 For a review of the recent theoretical and empirical literature on product differentia-
tion barriers due to heavy advertising, see Comanor & Wilson, The Effect of Advertising on
Competition: A Survey, 17 J. EcoN. Lrr. 453 (1979). For a discussion of capital requirements
barriers, see Scherer, Economics of Scale and Industrial Concentration, in INDUSTRIAL
CONCENTRATION, supra note 13; id. at 105-12.
40 Bork, supra note 13, at 310-11.
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large capital or other entry requirements simply because of the risk and
uncertainty involved.
The uncertainty generated by these features is compounded by the
uncertainty surrounding the established firm's reactions. Will it cut price
drastically in an effort to root out the entrant immediately? Will the estab-
lished firm cut price a little and wait to see how the entrant fares? Will
the monopolist accept the new entry and restrict output to avoid a price
war? The potential entrant cannot be certain, and it may choose to forego
entry altogether where the established firm has developed a reputation for
meeting entry aggressively. As Professor Williamson has observed: "When
potential market share can be secured only at the expense of the dominant
firm, there is an especially high risk of economic reprisal."' Thus, past
predatory or exclusionary conduct by an established firm may create a
significant entry barrier.42
" Williamson, supra note 10, at 1522.
Arguably, a monopolist's prospective reaction would not deter an equally-efficient
rival, since if the monopolist does react agressively, it could be sued and enjoined for preda-
tory conduct. But present laws may not afford the entrant a cause of action. Suppose efficien-
cies of scale were exhausted at a market share of just 10%, and an otherwise equally-efficient
new entrant was prevented from expanding to that share due to a price reduction on the part
of the established firm. Since the established firm enjoys a market share far greater than 10%,
it can afford to lower its price enough to halt the entrant's expansion without incurring losses
itself. And, because the monopolist's price would still be a profitable price, it would not be
characterized as predatory by the Areeda-Turner test, even though it would effectively ex-
clude an equally-efficient rival. For a restatement of the test, see 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra
note 12, at 710-23. Several court decisions have expressed an inclination to follow the
Areeda-Turner test, at least in some circumstances; in these courts, the entrant may not have
a cause of action. See, e.g., Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 551 F.2d 790 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 879 (1977); Hanson v. Shell Oil Co., 541 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1976); International Air Indus. v. American Exel. Co., 517 F.2d
714 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 943 (1977).
Of course, the trouble may lie with the Areeda-Turner test. If the correct test for preda-
tion were applied, arguably, no equally-efficient firm would be deterred from challenging a
monopolist's position. The problem is in specifying the correct test for predation. Several
distinguished economists have disagreed with the Areeda-Turner approach and proposed
various tests of their own. See Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment,
89 HARv. L. Rav. 869 (1976); Schmalensee, On the Use of Economic Models in Antitrust: The
ReaLemon Case, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 994 (1979); Williamson, Predatory Pricing: A Strategic
and Welfare Analysis, 87 YAE L.J. 284 (1977); Williamson, Williamson on Predatory Pricing
II, 88 YALE L.J. 1183 (1979); BAMMOL, Quasi-Permanence of Price Reductions - A Policy for
Prevention of "Predatory Pricing", Apr. 1978 (unpub. manuscript). See also In re Borden,
Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 799-805 (1978); id. at 820-24 (Pitofsky, Comm'r, concurring).
The source of the controversy appears to be the tension between a rule simple enough to
be workable and one sophisticated enough to strike a tolerable balance between the immedi-
ate public interest in low prices and the long-run public interest in effective price and non-
price competition. In light of the difficulties in resolving this tension, the best course for
public policy may be ultimately to rely on structural relief rather than rules against predation
to ensure that persistent monopoly power is eventually eroded. As Professors Areeda and
Turner state: "Many markets capable of supporting greater competition appear to obstruct
new entry with barriers resulting from behavior which the antitrust laws cannot readily
reprehend." 3 AREEDA & TURNER, supra note 12, 618 at 42.
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Consequently, there are a number of factors other than predatory con-
duct or superior efficiency that may explain why a monopolist's position
has not been eroded within a reasonable period of time. Because of the
variety of possible sources of persistent monopoly power, the most appro-
priate course for public policy is to focus the proceedings on whether per-
sistent monopoly power exists. Should a court determine that a firm does
possess such power, the focus then should shift to whether feasible, con-
structive remedies are available.
2. Incentives to Compete
According to some commentators, a no-conduct standard has undesira-
ble disincentive effects, apart from any impact on the efficiency of the
dispersed firm. These commentators argue that firms will restrain their
competitive efforts to ensure that they are not subjected to antitrust pro-
ceedings under these standards.43 Although current law also produces such
disincentive effects, the Bureau of Competition's proposal purportedly
would increase those effects because it would remove the existing oppor-
tunity for the defendant to prove that it acquired monopoly power through
procompetitive rather than objectionable behavior.
The disincentive effects of our proposal, however, are probably no
greater, and may even be smaller, than those under the existing law. As a
practical matter, in government litigation, defendants may not be able to
rely heavily on the existing procompetitive conduct defense. After all, the
government has won the vast majority of the monopolization cases it has
brought." More importantly, defendants may have more to lose under
present Sherman Act cases than under the no-conduct approach. If firms
violate section 2 as it currently reads, 5 criminal sanctions are possible, and
expensive, private, treble-damage actions are likely. Furthermore, the
preoccupation of current law with deterring and punishing objectionable
conduct means that dissolution, if ordered, is more likely to occur without
adequate attention to scale efficiencies and the interests of shareholders,
creditors, and employees.
By contrast, our proposal permits neither criminal penalties nor private
enforcement of the statute. 8 The proposal's focus is not on punishing the
Finally, even if ideal legal rules could be framed, so that in theory no equally-efficient
rivals are deterred, entry may still be inhibited by transaction cost factors: the likelihood of
litigation, the cost and delay of such litigation, and the risk of losing the case.
a See, e.g., Bork, supra note 13, at 196-97; Posner, supra note 13, at 94.
' See Posner, supra note 13, at 82-83. Some commentators assert that a judicial finding
of objectionable conduct is virtually a foregone conclusion in government monopolization
cases involving substantial, persistent monopoly power. See Blecher & Woodhead, Bigness
and Badness: A Review of the Requirement of "Deliberateness" in Monopolization, 19 Sw.
L. Rav. 121 (1978); Wyzanski, The Judicial View of Section 2 Litigation, 19 Sw. L. Rzv. 45
(1978); Statement of John J. Flynn, National Comm. for the Review of Antitrust Laws and
Proc. (July 12, 1978).
4' See note 1 supra.
4, See note 4 supra.
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firm (or, indirectly, its shareholders) but on identifying substantial, per-
sistent monopoly power and determining whether or not feasible, construc-
tive remedies for dissipating that power are available. Because it places so
much emphasis on formulating effective, beneficial remedies, the Bureau
of Competition's proposal is in many ways more likely than prevailing law
to protect the firm's efficiencies and the interest of its stockholders, credi-
tors, and employees. 7
Finally, our proposal would apply only to substantial, persistent mo-
nopoly power in a properly defined relevant market. It should not discour-
age pro-competitive, market-share-increasing behavior, unless that behav-
ior were likely to result in monopoly power of both this magnitude and
duration. Because the vast majority of competitive business behavior
would not achieve such adverse results, however, the Bureau's proposal
should not significantly affect such performance. In sum, as Professors
Areeda and Turner explain, stringent requirements that the monopoly
power be both substantial and persistent coupled with restrictions against
private and criminal enforcement and an emphasis on contructive reme-
dies, should reduce any disincentive effects of no-conduct proposals to
tolerable levels. 48
3. Fairness
Another common argument against a no-conduct standard involves the
fairness of applying such a standard to firms that have not engaged in any
reprehensible conduct. Such an argument might have considerable force
if the remedies under the standard punished firms for acquiring and main-
taining monopoly power. They do not. On the contrary, the no-conduct
approach explicitly excludes remedies with punitive consequences and
overtones, such as criminal saictions and private treble damages. 9
Nonetheless, it is arguable that dissolution remedies have harsh, if not
punitive, consequences for certain groups. Individuals who have purchased
the shares of a monopolistic firm at a price which includes the capitalized
"1 Although effective structural remedies would deprive the firm of its monopoly profits,
the stockholders, creditors, and employees may be more than adequately compensated by the
increased output and internal efficiency stimulated by the resulting competition. And while
it is certainly significant that the firm's top executives may suffer a decline in power and
responsibility, it should be remembered that divisional heads and middle managers may
benefit in greater numbers as they assume top positions- in new entities created by the
structural relief. Greater diversity in the industry might also lead to increased innovation,
which in turn could lead to greater efficiency and enhanced performance throughout the
industry.
" See 3 AREEDA & TuRE, supra note 12, at 662. For a discussion emphasizing the
substantial, procompetitive incentives provided by the requirement that the monopoly power
be persistent (and as a result, that monopoly profits may be earned throughout the persist-
ence period), see Williamson, supra note 10, at 1528-29.
" See note 4 supra. To the extent that current law allows the application of punitive
remedies after only a perfunctory search for objectionable conduct, as some commentators
have suggested, it may be the current law which is unfair. See hote 44 supra.
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value of thatifirm's future monopoly profits may have the strongest claim
of unfairness. If dissolution or other equitable relief is effective in depriving
the firm of monopoly profits, these shareholders would not realize monop-
oly returns on their investments, and their stock values arguably might
decline. These shareholders realistically cannot be charged with the knowl-
edge that a firm in which they invested possessed sufficient monopoly
power to warrant dissolution. Yet, stockholders are in no better position
under current law. They cannot know whether firms in which they cur-
rently invest possess both the market power and the record of r eprehensible
conduct sufficient to justify a Sherman Act section 2 challenge." Moreover,
stockholders have more to lose under the present statute, which allows
both criminal sanctions and private treble damage actions, and which is
probably less solicitous of the firm's own efficiencies.
More important, if past experience is a reliable guide, these equitable
issues are unlikely to constitute real problems under either the Bureau's
proposal or current law. The best available evidence indicates that stock
prices have not declined, but have actually increased, following major
dissolutions.5 Perhaps the increased output and heightened internal effi-
ciencies stimulated by dissolution more than compensated for the loss of
expected monopoly profits. In any case, the historical record indicates that
stockholders have actually realized gains through dissolution."
B. Litigation of conduct issues is not inevitable
Even if litigation of conduct issues is not substantively necessary to
protect efficiencies, to preserve incentives to compete, or to maintain fair-
ness in monopolization cases, some commentators assert that such litiga-
tion is nonetheless inevitable as a practical matter. Conduct evidence will
be introduced, they contend, regardless of whether the purpose of such
evidence is to resolve key issues in a traditional monopolization case or to
flesh out structural issues in a no-conduct case. For example, in testimony
before NCRALP, Judge Frederick Lacey argued that elimination of the
conduct requirement would not reduce the amount of conduct evidence
discovered and introduced because existing standards of relevance would
still govern proceedings.53 Parties might use Rule 26 of the Federal Rules
5 Our proposal, of course, is designed to supplement rather than replace § 2. See note 4
supra. Nonetheless, the procedural ind substantive benefits offered by the non-punitive no-
conduct approach should lend the government and perhaps even the defendant to prefer it,
where otherwise appropriate.
51 See Baldwin, The Feedback Effect of Business Conduct on Industry Structure, 12 J.L.
& EcoN. 123 (1969); Brodley, Industrial Deconcentration and Legal Feasibility: The Efficien-
cies Defense, 9 J. ECON. ISsUEs 365 (1975); Kovacic, Is Breaking Up So Hard To Do? - The
Feasibility of Implementing Corporate Reorganizations Pursuant to Congressionally-Ordered
Deconcentration Measures (Jan. 1978)(unpub. manuscript).
'1. Analogous arguments can be made in the cases of creditors and employees.
" Statement of Frederick B. Lacey, National Comm. for the Review of Antitrust Laws
and Proc. (Sept. 13, 1978)[hereinafter cited as Lacey Statement].
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of Civil Procedure, he pointed out, to obtain conduct evidence,5' or invoke
Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, to introduce it.5 According to
Judge Lacey, these broad standards would permit introduction of the very
evidence that a no-conduct standard seeks to exclude."
Of course, the Bureau of Competition's proposal would not exclude
conduct evidence from every case. In some cases, it may be impossible to
satisfactorily resolve certain issues without limited resort to conduct evi-
dence. But extensive discovery and litigation of conduct issues should be
rare. There are methods of establishing each element of a monopolization
case under our proposal within an intensive appraisal of firm behavior.
Market definition, for example, may be established by examining such
factors as: perceptions of the market's boundaries by the defendant, its
customers, suppliers, and rivals; product characteristics and uses; patterns
and methods of production, distribution, marketing, and consumption;
relative prices, price elasticities, and cross-elasticities, of both supply and
demand; and changes in these factors over time. Similarly, monopoly
power could be demonstrated through evidence relating to: market shares,
profitability, price-cost margins, price discrimination, price rigidity or
price increases in the face of stable demand and declining costs, internal
inefficiency, and trends in these factors over time.57
Formulation of a feasible and constructive remedy also could be accom-
plished without resort to conduct evidence. Our proposal encourages em-
ployment of structural remedies in the ordinary case. Dissolution is the
u Rule 26(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is
relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action, whether it relates to
the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or to the claim or defense of any
other party, including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition and
location of any books, documents or other tangible things and the identity and
location of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. It is not ground
for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at the trial if the
information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admis-
sible evidence.
Id.
", Rule 401 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides: "Relevant evidence means evi-
dence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." Id.
"Lacey Statement, supra note 53.
'7 The significance of these factors in establishing substantial, persistent monopoly
power would, of course, vary with their size and duration. Moreover, as under current law,
where market share persistently has been very high, it may be appropriate to find monopoly
power without an inquiry into other factors. See, e.g., United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384
U.S. 563, 571 (1966) (87% market share constitutes monopoly power; no examination of other
factors). When market share has not been persistently very high, it would be appropriate to
examine other factors, as current law permits. For a discussion of market share and other
factors for proving monopoly power, see SuLuv~A, supra note 15, at 74-91. For a treatment
emphasizing the importance of high price-cost margins and high profitability, see 3 AREEDA
& TuRNEs, supra note 12, at 801-09.
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preferred remedy (if feasible without a substantial loss of scale efficien-
cies), but licensing of trademarks or patents could be employed as alterna-
tive or supplemental relief if substantial efficiences are not thereby
sacrificed. Whether a licensing remedy should be considered would depend
upon the extent of the price and cost advantages conferred by the firm's
patents or trademarks. Determination of this issue generally could be ac-
complished through the same kinds of evidence used to establish market
definition."
If dissolution is being considered, a court must assess the resultant
effects on scale efficiencies. Efficiencies of scale may be measured through
a variety of means, including survivorship studies, statistical cost studies,
and the so-called engineering method. Although each of these methodolo-
gies has shortcomings,59 in many cases they should prove adequate." More-
over, our proposal contains incentives for improving these methodologies.
If enacted, the proposal's legislative history would place a heavy burden
on the government agencies to carefully study the firm and industry before
filing enforcement actions. An essential ingredient of this preparation
would involve a thorough analysis of scale efficiencies within the particular
" For example, evidence with respect to consumption patterns, and price elasticities and
cross-elasticities of demand, could be used to show that a firm's principle trademark gives
the firm a significant price advantage over its rivals. Of course, simply establishing that a
trademark confers a significant advantage does not prove that trademark licensing would be
a feasible and constructive remedy. Questions of quality control, possible disincentive effects,
and likely reactions of consumers need to be addressed. But these questions ordinarily can
be satisfactorily resolved without intensive appraisal of the firm's past conduct.
For an exposition and critique of each of these methodologies, as well as a summary
of the existing evidence on scale efficiencies, see INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION, supra note 13,
ch. 2. See also REPORT OF THE [CANADIAN] ROYAL COMMISSION ON CORPORATION
CONCENTRATION, ch. 3 (1978); F. SCHERER, A. BECKENSTEIN, E. KAUFER & R. MURPHY, THE
ECONOMICS OF MULTI-PLANT OPERATIONS (1975)[hereinafter cited as MULTI-PLANT
OPERATIONS].
10 Perhaps the greater concern is that the engineering method, which many consider to
be the most precise and reliable, has not been used extensively to measure managerial effi-
ciencies. Although in their major international study of multi-plant efficiencies, Scherer and
his colleagues examined other sources of nonproduction economies such as research and
development, advertising, and procurement, they did not systematically appraise managerial
efficiencies. MULTI-PLANT OPERATIONS, supra note 59, at 321-25. In view of this record, it would
be appropriate for courts to give greater weight to evidence on production efficiencies and to
non-production efficiencies other than managerial efficiencies than to evidence on manage-
rial efficiencies. Nevertheless, in our judgment, the problems of measuring managerial effi-
ciencies are notinsurmountable. To measure production economies, the engineering approach
relies principally on interviews with experts in the design and operation of production com-
plexes. Management and business consultants should be able to provide the same kinds of
evidence with respect to managerial efficiencies. Moreover, many kinds of managerial econ-
omies are not true efficiencies of scale; they will be transferred not lost, through dissolution.
For example, certain organizational innovations achieved by the monopolist should be dis-
seminated rather than destroyed through division of the firm. As Professor Williamson has
pointed out to us, to the extent there are managerial team economies, in most cases this
requires only that management teams be assembled with care. There is sufficient experience
and talent in most large firms to assemble several effective management teams.
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firm and industry. Because the Bureau's proposal emphasizes the formula-
tion of feasible and beneficial remedies to an extent unprecedented in
antitrust litigation, both public and private litigants probably would de-
vote considerable resources to this aspect of the proceeding. Consequently,
the techniques available for measuring scale efficiencies should show
steady improvement.
There are additional general incentives built into our proposal that
would minimize the recourse to conduct evidence in specific cases. The
government should not bring a case under our proposal unless it is reasona-
bly certain of prevailing without significant resort to conduct evidence.
Moreover, because defendants may have less to lose under our proposal,
they should have less incentive to protract and confuse the litigation of
essential issues. Finally, the costs and delay that accompany the use of
conduct evidence would provide still further incentive for the parties and
courts to avoid these issues, particularly in light of the difficulties of relia-
bly appraising the intent and effects of firm conduct.
There are no simple rules, of course, which will enable every judge in
every case to decide how much conduct evidence to consider. Nevertheless,
this proposal would give judges, who traditionally are afforded considera-
ble discretion in limiting discovery"1 and excluding evidence,"2 a powerful
new tool to refine the focus and reduce the protraction of government
monopolization cases. For most judges, this addition should be enough to
achieve significant results. 3
Lastly, an analogy to litigation experience with the per se rule against
price-fixing" provides an intriguing indication that conduct evidence
would not overwhelm proceedings under the Bureau of Competition's pro-
posal. A major purpose of that rule is to make price-fixing litigation more
manageable. Arguably, the per se rule would never achieve this objective,
because characterization of practices as price-fixing, rather than merely as
activities affecting price, must precede its application. Consequently, it
could have been argued, a court would have to consider all of the evidence
pertaining to the practice-including its history, business context, pur-
, See, e.g., LSL Corp. v. United States, 503 F.2d 558, 559 (9th Cir. 1974). See also 8 C.
WmGHT & A. Mamr, FEDEAmL PRAcrcE AND PRocEDuRE § 2006 at 34-36 (1970).
11 Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence states: "Although relevant, evidence may
be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair preju-
dice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay,
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." See also Estate of LeBaron
v. Rohm & Haas Co., 506 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1974); Bowman v. General Motors Corp., 427
F. Supp. 234, 239-40 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Vockie v. General Motors Corp., 66 F.R.D. 57, 60 (E.D.
Pa.), aff'd mem., 523 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir. 1975).
u Our proposal is not intended, however, as a substitute for the various procedural
reforms recommended by the Commission. On the contrary, several of these suggestions (e.g.,
setting of strict trial dates and discovery periods, narrowing the scope of discovery, and
selecting particularly qualified judges or panels to try unusually complex cases) - are comple-
mentary with this substantive proposal. See Kingdon, The "Big Antitrust Case": Thoughts
On Procedural Reform, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 25 (1980).
11 See generally SULuvAN, supra note 15, at 165-86, 192-97.
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pose, and likely effect-to make a preliminary determination as to whether
or not the activity constituted price-fixing. Significantly, that result has
not ocurred in most cases. Rather, the application of the per se rule has
significantly expedited price-fixing litigation. Eliminating the conduct
requirement in government monopolization cases should produce a similar
result, particularly as actual experience with no-conduct litigation accu-
mulates. 5
II.
MORE EFFECTIVE REMEDIES
Not only would our proposal streamline the substantive phase of mono-
polization by eliminating the conduct requirement, it also would improve
and expedite the litigation of remedial issues through several procedural
changes. First, the legislative history of our proposal should indicate that
the government enforcement agencies must conduct a thorough study of
the industry and firm in question before filing a complaint. Such prepara-
tion should increase the probability of careful and expeditious litigation of
remedy and scale efficiency issues. Second, litigation of scale efficiency
issues would occur in the relief stage of a proceeding. This procedure
should be beneficial because by this stage, both the firm and the invest-
ment community would expect that some form of structural relief is immi-
nent. Delaying the proceedings would only prolong the period of uncer-
tainty and any consequent disruption of the firm's relationships with its
bankers and investors." Finally, precluding criminal and private treble
damage enforcement of a no-conduct statute provides an additional source
of improvement, for with less at stake than under present law, firms would
have less cause to protract and impede the proceeding.
Beyond these procedural benefits, our proposal should improve the
effectiveness of government monopolization cases through its clear prefer-
ence for structural relief where feasible, constructive remedies exist. In the
past, courts rarely have awarded significant structural relief in monopoli-
zation cases. The law's conduct requirement has tended to focus judicial
attention on conduct remedies and away from the generally more effective
structural forms of relief. Our proposal would change this emphasis by
expressly encouraging courts to use structural remedies. This approach is
preferable and appropriate for several reasons.
First, as we have argued above, monopoly power may persist because
of factors other than bad conduct or superior efficiency. Thus, where a
monopolist's undesirable conduct is only tangentially related to his power,
an injunction directed at conduct is unlikely to be effective.
13 For an interesting discussion of this point, see Sims, No Fault Monopoly: A Pig in a
Poke?, Legal Times of Washington, Nov. 20, 1978, at 8.
11 Some disruption of normal business operations may be expected to result from the
uncertainties caused by an antitrust challenge, whether under traditional or no-conduct
monopolization theories. The no-conduct approach, however, seeks to reduce this uncertainty
by providing more expeditious proceedings.
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Second, even when the monopolist's power eventually would erode (in
the absence of certain forms of misconduct), there are problems with in-
junctive relief. The challenged conduct may have both pro-competitive
and anti-competitive aspects, making it difficult or impossible to frame an
injunction that adequately discourages the undesirable aspects without
unduly inhibiting the pro-competitive effects. In particular, judges may
have difficulty writing orders which deal appropriately with subtle or com-
plex forms of predatory conduct perhaps involving elements of pricing,
capital expansion, product differentiation, and/or research and develop-
ment expenditures. Yet, if the order is incomplete, the monopolist may
preserve his power simply by turning to other, similarly effective forms of
conduct that are beyond the province of the injunction.
Third, and perhaps most important, even when the injunction is rela-
tively effective in preventing the monopolist from employing anticompeti-
tive conduct to protect its position, an unacceptably long period of time
may elapse before the monopoly power erodes. In the United Shoe
Machinery case, 7 for example, Judge Wyzanski refused to order dissolu-
tion of the defendant's only shoe machinery manufacturing plant on the
ground'that dissolution was "impractical.""6 While he issued an injunction
designed, inter alia, to remove the most anti-competitive features of
United Shoe's long-term machinery leases, Judge Wyzanski would not
order structural relief unless the injunction proved ineffective.69 Ten years
later, although United Shoe's market share had declined twenty-three per-
centage points, it still remained at sixty-two percent.70 The Supreme Court
found this slow pace of erosion unacceptable and ordered Judge Wyzanski
to consider structural relief.7'
Similarly, in 1936, the Supreme Court affirmed an order under section
3 of the Clayton Act 72 enjoining International Business Machines Corp.
from requiring the use of IBM tabulating cards as a condition for leasing
IBM punching machines, sorters, and tabulators.15 The company had an
eighty-one percent share of the market for tabulating cards, and derived
substantial profits from that operation. These and other facts convinced
,1 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass 1953), aff'd per
curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954).
,Id. at 348.
" Id. at 346-51.
70 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 266 F. Supp. 328, 331 (D. Mass. 1967),
rev'd in part, 391 U.S. 244 (1968).
71 The Supreme Court stated:
If the decree has not ... achieved its "principal objects," namely, "to extirpate
practices that have caused or may hereafter cause monopolization, and to restore
workable competition in the market" - the time has come to prescribe other, and if
necessary more definitive, means to achieve the result. A decade is enough.
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Co., 391 U.S. 244, 251-52 (1968), rev'g in part, 266 F.
Supp. 328 (D. Mass. 1967).
' 25 U.S.C. § 14 (1976).
International Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
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the Court that the tying clause in the leases tended "to create monopoly,
and has in fact been a important and effective step in the creation of
monopoly."" Twenty years later, however, the injunctive relief had not
proved effective. In 1956, IBM signed a consent decree providing that, if
certain injunctive provisions did not cause its tabulating card market share
to fall below fifty percent in seven years, divestiture would be ordered. 5
Again, the conduct relief proved ineffective and, nearly three decades after
the original decree, the court ordered divestiture of this subsidiary."
A recent statistical study suggests that these cases typify a more gen-
eral pattern.77 Professor William Shepherd charted the market shares of
245 large firms over the period 1960-1969. Although he discovered a signifi-
cant tendency for the market shares of these firms to decline, Professor
Shepherd found that the rate of decay was very slow. On the average, it
would take twenty to thirty years to abate a monopoly position. Moreover,
Professor Shepherd observed that "there are major exceptions, in which
dominant firms maintain high market shares and profit rates for many
decades."78 This evidence indicates that conduct relief may work, but at
an intolerably slow pace in many cases, and perhaps not at all in some
cases. In contrast, structural relief creates more competitive conditions in
a market within a relatively short period of time."
Finally, we note that the National Commission concluded, as we are
asserting here, that courts should consider structural remedies as the pri-
mary mode of relief in monopolization cases. The National Commission
effectively summarized its reasons as follows:
In essence, the effectiveness of structural relief in ending the illegal
conduct, preventing its recurrence, curing the ill effects of the
conduct, and depriving defendants of the benefits of their illegal
conduct is more certain and brings the matter to a conclusion more
T' Id. at 136.
7' United States v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., [1956 Transfer Binder] TRAU. REG.
REP. (CCH) 68,245 (S.D.N.Y. 1956).
11 United States v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., [1963 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 70,628 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). For a discussion of a case in which an injunction
against tying did have a rapid, marked effect on a firm's share of the market for the tied
product, see the discussion of the 1954 Department of Justice investigation of Eastman Kodak
Co. resulting in a consent decree breaking the tie between sales of Kodak film and film
processing, in D. WALDMAN, ANTITRUST ACTON AND MARKET STRucTum, 143-50 (1978).
" W. SHEPHERD, THE TRF TmFNTr OF MARKET POWER (1975).
78 Id. at 125.
1, The amount of actual competition created depends, of course, on the extent to which
structural relief would cause a substantial loss of efficiencies of scale. Moreover, even if
structural relief does tend to be more effective than injunctive relief, it may be more costly
to implement, or impose greater costs on stockholders, creditors, and other third parties than
injunctive relief. The best available studies on these issues, however, conclude that imple-
mentation costs can be adequately contained, and that shareholders, creditors, and others
have tended to benefit rather than suffer through divestiture and corporation organizations.
See note 51 supra.
ELIMINATION OF CONDUCT
quickly. Structural relief requires an immediate adjustment, but
once it has been accomplished, the defendant firm regains control
of its operations. With respect to third parties, structural relief is
often preferable because its effects are clearer and more certain.
For these reasons, the Commission concludes that structural relief
should be the preferred remedy whenever a violation of Sherman
Act Section 2 or Clayton Act Section 7 has been found.10.
CONCLUSION
As NCRALP concluded, there is indeed a need to "rationalize monopol-
ization litigation" by eliminating the significant effort and resources spent
on the unnecessary appraisal of past firm behavior, and by making in-
creased use of structural remedies to redress persistent monopoly power.'
The Bureau of Competition's no-conduct monopolization proposal would
promote both these objectives while advancing the major objectives of
competition policy: dissipating monopoly power, preserving efficiencies,
protecting incentives to compete, and insuring the fairness of the antitrust
enforcement system.
See NCRALP REPoRT, supra note 6, at 119, 897 ANTITRUST & TRADE REQ. REP. (BNA)
(Special Supp.) at 34.
", See id. at 157-58, 897 ANTTRusT & TADE REG. REP. (BNA)(Special Supp.) at 47-48;
note 8 supra.
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